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Although quantum communication systems are being deployed on a global scale, their realistic
security certification is not yet available. Here we present a security evaluation methodology for a
complete quantum communication system. We have subdivided the system into seven layers based
on a hierarchical order of information flow, and categorised its known implementation imperfec-
tions by hardness of protection and practical risk. To illustrate the use of our methodology, we
report security evaluation results of a sub-carrier wave quantum key distribution system and the
follow-up interactions between the manufacturer and the security evaluation team. This has led to
improvements in the system security. We hope our method enters future standards for quantum
cryptography.
I. INTRODUCTION
Instead of relying on assumptions of computational hard-
ness like most other classical cryptography protocols,
quantum cryptography relies on the laws of physics for
providing information-theoretic security. From the first
theoretical proposal in 1983 [1] to the recent key exchange
via satellite over 1200 km [2], quantum key distribution
(QKD) has come forward a long way. Over the course of
time, the journey has been (and is still being) impeded by
a number of attacks that exploit the deviations between
theory and practice in a quantum-optical part of the sys-
tem implementation [3–12]. Ironically, as a consequence
of the attacks, QKD has been equipped with improved
protocols and tools like decoy states [13, 14], measure-
ment device independence [15], device-independence [16],
twin-field QKD [17] and so on. As a result, QKD today
is much more secure and efficient in practice than it was
20 years ago.
It is now time for QKD to be expanded and deployed
on a larger scale. As the push from the lab to practi-
cal deployment is initiated in various parts of the globe,
a number of security, compatibility and connectivity is-
sues are needed to be solved. These demand developing
universally accepted standards and certification method-
ologies, and also the formation of a common platform
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for collaboration and addressing these issues. To fulfil
this need, ETSI has had an industry specification group
for QKD (ISG-QKD) since 2008 that provides a plat-
form for the creation of universally accepted standards
and promotes coordination, cooperation and standard-
ization of research for QKD [18–20]. Development of
security certification standards is at present being dis-
cussed in this group and in other standards organisa-
tions such as International Organisation for Standardis-
ation (ISO) and International Telecommunication Union
(ITU). At the same time, several recent studies attempt
to introduce certification of countermeasures against spe-
cific vulnerabilities in the quantum optical part. For ex-
ample, Ref. 21 studies the security of a photon source in
a fiber-based QKD system against a general Trojan-horse
attack (THA) [22, 23]. By treating the attack as an in-
formation leakage problem, the secure key rate becomes
a function of the specifications of the installed optical
components. The latter can be characterised when nec-
essary. A similar approach has been suggested for other
individual imperfections [12, 24–26]. A methodology to
characterise and secure the source against several imper-
fections is under development [27]. Attention to several
imperfections and attacks is being paid when designing
QKD equipment [28].
Although these studies have addressed several individ-
ual vulnerabilities, no complete system analysis has yet
been reported. This is what we do in this work. We
lay out a methodology for security evaluation and certi-
fication of a complete quantum communication system
against all known implementation imperfections in its
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2quantum optical part. For this purpose, we first propose
a layered structure that subdivides the complete system
into seven layers. This allows us to see what layers belong
to the scope of analysis done this work, and what layers
fall into classical information security domain that should
be tackled separately by a team with a different expertise.
Then we categorise each implementation imperfection in
the quantum optical part – expected or existing in the
system – in terms of hardness of solution. This allows us
to assign a risk level to each of them, which is useful for
the manufacturer for prioritising patch development.
Our proposed methodology requires an iterative inter-
action: security evaluation from the testing team; then
patching from the manufacturer; then again security eval-
uation, and so on. Throughout this iterative process, the
system security is gradually expected to reach a level that
can be trusted and widely accepted. As an example of us-
ing this methodology, we present the results of our initial
security evaluation performed at ITMO University and
Quantum Communication Ltd. (St. Petersburg, Russia)
in 2017. They are therefore the first commercial QKD
manufacturer to openly publish the security assessment
of their system. We also present a follow-up work that
has been done by the manufacturer as a response to our
initial evaluation. It consists of theoretical and exper-
imental studies that have allowed the manufacturer to
quickly improve implementation security of their prod-
uct by patching its most prominent loopholes [29–31].
We hope that our methodology will pave the way for de-
veloping security evaluation and certification standards
for complete quantum communication systems.
The security evaluation team has performed a similar
initial analysis in 2016 on the QKD system Clavis3 from
ID Quantique (Switzerland) and on 40 MHz QKD system
from QuantumCTek (China). The follow-up with the
latter is currently in progress. While the methodology of
these projects has been similar to that reported in this
Article, their content remain confidential at the request
of the manufacturers.
The Article is organised as follows. Our proposed lay-
ered architecture of the complete quantum communica-
tion system is presented in Sec. II and our severity rating
scheme for the implementation imperfections in Sec. III.
We describe the system under test in Sec. IV and its
initial security analysis results in Sec. V. The follow-up
work by the manufacturer is presented in Sec. VI. We
conclude in Sec. VII.
II. SYSTEM IMPLEMENTATION LAYERS
Security analysis of a complete quantum communication
system is a complex procedure that requires different ar-
eas of expertise. To simplify the job and ensure that peo-
ple with specific expertise can tackle the right problems,
it is necessary to subdivide the implementation complex-
ity into layers. In our security analysis, we have subdi-
vided the system implementation into seven layers based
on a hierarchical order of information flow and control as
presented in Table I. Our layer structure is conceptually
similar to the open systems interconnection (OSI) model
for telecommunication systems [32]. Just like OSI lay-
ers, a layer in our system serves the layer above it and
is served by the layer below; however, unlike OSI, all our
layers are inside one system, and most of them are not
abstraction layers. When a generic system is installed,
it starts with the top layer: Q7 installation and main-
tenance; then operation and processing is subsequently
initiated in each underlying layer until it gets down to
handling quantum states in Q1 optics layer. Once the
optics layer generates photon detections, they are again
processed in each layer above in sequence until the top
layers: either Q6 handing the secret key over to the ap-
plication that has requested it, or all the way up to Q7.
Below we explain the functioning of each layer with ex-
amples.
The lowest layer Q1 handles the photonic signals that
carry the quantum states and service functions. The next
layer Q2 interfaces the optical components with digital
processing and possibly performs some analog signal pro-
cessing. It contains analog electronics and digital-analog
converters. Q3 comprises digital and software algorithms
that immediately control the electronics and optics, in-
cluding its calibration aspects. It might contain, for ex-
ample, a set of algorithms to maintain avalanche photodi-
ode (APD) temperature, bias voltage, gating. The next
layer Q4 is software that decides which Q3 layer subrou-
tine to run. For example, it decides when APDs need
to be cooled, or when gating control should be initiated.
The next layer Q5 processes the raw data generated by
the protocol to distill secret keys. The layer above Q6
handles the communication between the quantum proto-
col and the classical application that asks for the service
of the protocol. Finally, the topmost layer Q7 handles
issues in any underlying layer that require human inter-
vention, even if the human follows a checklist. We have
found that the system evaluated in this Article, as well
as several other QKD systems [33], allow a clear division
into this layer structure.
We remark that an initial theoretical proposal of a
quantum communication protocol (such as Refs. 1 and
34) covers a part of the single layer Q5, while being
mostly ignorant of the other layers except their few se-
lected aspects. However practical security loopholes can
be present anywhere in the complete implementation and
be in any of its layers. The implementation of each layer
has high technical complexity and contain tens of opti-
cal components, operator’s checklists, thousands of elec-
tronic components and lines of software code. The task
of security analysis is to find all the loopholes.
3TABLE I. Implementation layers in a quantum communication system.
Layer Description
Q7. Installation and maintenance Manual management procedures done by the manufacturer, network operator, and
end users.
Q6. Application interface Handles the communication between the quantum communication protocol and the
(classical) application that has asked for the service. For example, for QKD this
layer may transfer the generated key to an encryption device or key distribution
network. For quantum secure direct communication this layer transfers secret
messages from/to an external unit that sends and receives them.
Q5. Post-processing Handles the post-processing of the raw data. For QKD it involves preparation and
storage of raw key data, sifting, error correction, privacy amplification,
authentication, and the communication over a classical public channel involved in
these steps.
Q4. Operation cycle State machine that decides when to run subsystems in different regimes, at any
given time, alternating between qubit transmission, calibration and other service
procedures, and possibly idling.
Q3. Driver and calibration algorithms Firmware/software routines that control low-level operation of analog electronics
and electro-optical devices in different regimes.
Q2. Analog electronics interface Electronic signal processing and conditioning between firmware/software and
electro-optical devices. This includes for example current-to-voltage conversion,
signal amplification, mixing, frequency filtering, limiting, sampling, timing-to-digital
and analog-to-digital conversions.
Q1. Optics Generation, modulation, transmission and detection of optical signals, implemented
with optical and electro-optical components. This includes both quantum states and
service optical signals for synchronization and calibration. For example, in a
decoy-state BB84 QKD protocol this layer may include generation of weak coherent
pulses with different polarization and intensity, their transmission, polarization
splitting and detection, but also optical pointing-and-tracking for telescopes.
III. QUANTIFYING HARDNESS AGAINST
IMPLEMENTATION IMPERFECTIONS
When an implementation imperfection is suspected to be
security-critical, it is necessary to evaluate the security
risks. The first step is testing. If it is found to be com-
promising the security then the next step is to design
a countermeasure solution, and the last step is checking
the robustness of that solution. This procedure is of-
ten a loop, because most countermeasures in turn need
to be tested. In an attempt to standardise this process,
we have categorised the implementation imperfections in
terms of existing solutions as shown in Table II. The low-
est state CX indicates that the imperfection is suspected
to be a potential security issue, and needs to be further
analysed or tested before a conclusion can be made. Af-
ter an imperfection is found to be security-critical, its
state becomes C0, i.e., insecure. Next, a solution needs
to be developed that provides security against the origi-
nal attack model. At this state the solution is expected
to be robust and the state is considered to be C2. Af-
ter it has been integrated into a security proof, the state
can be shifted to C3: solution secure. However, often it
may be the case that newer attack models are found that
bypass the countermeasure; then the state moves to C1,
which means the solution is robust only against a specific
attack model but not against others or a combination of
the original and some other attacks.
For example, in ID Quantique Clavis2 QKD system,
the bright-light detector control attack became C0 upon
its discovery in 2009 [3], was reclassified C2 after being
patched in 2015, then downgraded to C1 next year after
the patch was demonstrated to be inadequate against
a modified attack [10]. A similar development can be
traced for another imperfection, a variation of detector
efficiency with angle of the incoming light [7]. It was
suspected to be a security vulnerability (CX) up to 2015,
then proven to be so (C0) in 2015 [7, 37], then moved to
C2 by the use of a pinhole and later brought down to C1
after the results presented in Refs. 9 and 38.
We emphasize that the categorisation of a specific
vulnerability reflects only the existing knowledge about
them, and may change with time as seen from the above
discussion. Also the categorisation of a particular im-
perfection is specific for each particular system. For
example, an imperfection in the single-photon detectors
may be classified as insecure (C0) but the same imper-
fection might be irrelevant (C3) for a system running a
measurement-device-independent (MDI) QKD protocol.
Eventually, the goal of the manufacturer (and security
certification) should be to update the system such that
all imperfections are on the level C3. Level C3 should be
4TABLE II. Hardness against implementation imperfections. Here we propose a classification scheme quantifying how
robust a given system or countermeasure is against a given imperfection. The hardness level is assigned to each particular
imperfection and the same imperfection at different systems may be assigned different levels. For each imperfection the hardness
level reflects current knowledge, and may change over time.
Hardness level Description Examples
C3. Solution secure Imperfection is either not applicable or has
been addressed with proven security.
The threat of a photon-number-splitting attack on
multiphoton pulses is eliminated by the decoy-state
protocol [13, 14]; detector imperfections are made
irrelevant by measurement-device-independent (MDI)
QKD [15]; statistical fluctuations owing to finite
sample size are accounted by finite-key post-processing.
C2. Solution robust This is the status of many countermeasures
after their initial design. With time this
state may move up to C3 after a security
proof is completed, or down to C1 or C0
after working attacks on it are found.
Phase-remapping in Clavis2 [4] (the imperfection is
there, but any known attack attempting to exploit it
causes too many errors); long wavelength Trojan-horse
attack on Bob in Clavis2 [11] (the use of a narrowpass
wavelength filter appears to be sufficient given that any
known remaining attack causes too many errors).
C1. Solution only
partially effective
Countermeasure is successful against
certain attack(s), but known to be
vulnerable against at least one other attack
or a modification of the original attack.
Random-efficiency countermeasure against detector
control in Clavis2 [10]; pulse-energy-monitoring system
in Alice against Trojan-horse attack [6]; pinhole
countermeasure against detector-efficiency-mismatch
attacks [7].
C0. Insecure Security-critical imperfection has been
confirmed to exist, but no countermeasure
has been implemented.
Laser damage attack on the pulse-energy-monitoring
detector in Alice in Clavis2 [9] and on optical
attenuators in several systems [31]; photon emission
caused by detection events in single-photon
detectors [12, 35].
CX. Not tested Imperfection is suspected to exist and be
security-critical, but has not been tested.
Patch for channel-calibration in Clavis2 [36];
imperfections reported in Ref. 8 against
detector-device-independent QKD.
considered good for a commercial product, while levels
C1, C0 and CX should be deemed inadequate and need
to be remedied by a security update or new product de-
velopment. Level C2 lies in the gray zone and while it
may be considered secure for practical purposes, i.e., ad-
equate for a commercial product, one should remember
that it has no theoretical security proof based on quan-
tum mechanics. However, the development of security
proofs taking into account imperfections can – in some
cases – be a slow process, and we expect many of them
to attain C2 earlier than C3.
IV. SECURITY EVALUATION OF ITMO’S
SUBCARRIER WAVE QUANTUM KEY
DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM
In the rest of this Article we demonstrate how our pro-
posed security evaluation and certification methodology
can be applied to a specific system. As an example,
we select the subcarrier wave quantum key distribution
(SCW QKD) system manufactured by ITMO University
and its spin-off company Quantum Communications Ltd.
The manufacturer has provided us with an overall design
specification of the system along with further oral infor-
mation and written notes on various aspects of design
and manufacturing process. We had physical access to
the hardware but, at the time of initial evaluation, did
not perform any experiments on the setup. Following the
methodology from Sec. II and Table I, we have subdi-
vided the system implementation into seven layers and
performed a complete security analysis of the bottom
four layers (Q1–Q4) that correspond to optics, analog
electronics, driver and calibration algorithms, and oper-
ation cycle of the system. For these layers, we aim to
examine all suspected implementation security issues ac-
cording to the current knowledge. For higher layers Q5
and up (from QKD protocol post-processing and up), we
cannot perform a complete security evaluation as they
lay outside our expertise area; they should be analysed
by a team with expertise in classical information tech-
nology security. Nevertheless, we have pointed out a few
issues in the layer Q5.
The results of this security evaluation have initially
been delivered to ITMO in a confidential report in Febru-
ary 2018 (prepared by those authors not affiliated with
ITMO). The content of that report is presented in Sec. V,
after we briefly introduce the system to the reader.
The subcarrier wave QKD principle was proposed in
1999 [39] and experimentally demonstrated later the
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FIG. 1. Basic subcarrier-wave QKD scheme. Insets show
optical spectra at different points in the setup. ATT, opti-
cal attenuator; PSM, electro-optical phase shift modulator;
SF, notch spectral filter; SPD, single-photon detector.
same year [40]. It was initially conceived as a prac-
tical fiber-optic system offering an alternative to then-
dominant polarization and time-bin encoding schemes
that would require a precise alignment during opera-
tion [39], as well as to “plug-and-play” systems devel-
oped a year earlier [41] that limited QKD source rep-
etition rate due to an intrinsic two-pass architecture.
More recently, SCW QKD has been demonstrated as
being robust against external conditions affecting the
telecom fiber [42], allowing increased spectral density
[43, 44], and being invariant to telescope rotation in
open-air links [45]. Its viability has been experimentally
demonstrated for metropolitan area telecommunication
lines [46], multi-user [47, 48] and software-defined [49]
networks.
A basic design of the SCW QKD system is shown
in Fig. 1. In Alice module, a continuous narrow linewidth
laser acts as a light source. This radiation with frequency
ω is usually referred as carrier wave, or simply a car-
rier. It passes through an electro-optical phase modula-
tor, to which an electrical driving signal with frequency
Ω is applied. As a result, two subcarriers (or sidebands)
with frequencies ω − Ω and ω + Ω appear in the opti-
cal frequency spectrum, as shown on the inset in Fig. 1.
Quantum information is encoded in the phase shift ϕA
between the carrier and the subcarriers, which is induced
by phase modulation of the electrical driving signal [42].
Four phase states (0, pi/2, pi, 3pi/2) are used in both Al-
ice and Bob modules. After modulation the signal passes
to the quantum channel through an attenuator. Carrier
power, modulation index and attenuation value are cho-
sen so that the mean photon number µsb (on two side-
bands combined) meets the protocol requirements. On
Bob side a similar modulator introduces phase shift ϕB
resulting in single-photon interference on the sidebands.
An optical filter separates the carrier from the sidebands,
and the latter are detected on a single-photon detector.
The registered optical power depends on the difference
|ϕA − ϕB |. If Alice and Bob introduce equal phase shifts
constructive interference is observed, and the optical sig-
nal power at the sidebands differs from zero. In the op-
posite case, when the difference equals pi, destructive in-
terference occurs and the registered counts correspond to
dark noise of the detector. Instances when the difference
is pi/2 are discarded during sifting. Key bits are obtained
from the registered counts using algorithms similar to a
phase-encoded BB84 protocol [42, 50]. A full quantum
description of the system and the implemented protocols
can be found in Refs. 29 and 50.
V. POTENTIAL VULNERABILITIES
Based on the received information about the system, we
have identified a number of potential security issues that
might be exploitable by an adversary Eve. A summary of
them is given in Table III. Almost all the identified issues
require further detailed analysis, and in many cases, in-
depth experimental testing in a laboratory. We assign
a hardness C-level (see Sec. III) to each issue to reflect
the state of the corresponding solution. For many issues,
this level is CX, meaning the issue’s applicability to the
system implementation needs to be studied and tested.
We specify in which system implementationQ-layers each
issue is located, according to the classification introduced
in Sec. II.
The risk evaluation listed in Table III is based on a
guessed likelihood of the vulnerability, expected fraction
of the secret key leakage, and estimated feasibility of ex-
ploit technology. This risk estimate is useful for the man-
ufacturer with limited resources to prioritize the prob-
lems. Vulnerabilities that can be exploited using today’s
technology and deliver the full secret key to Eve are a
more immediate threat. They should be addressed be-
fore those that require future technology or provide only
partial key information (thus requiring of Eve an addi-
tional classical cryptanalytic task). We remark that we
have followed this strategy and tested the two highest risk
hardware issues after the delivery of the original evalua-
tion report (see Sec. VI). The security proof and imple-
mentation of post-processing have also been completed
after the report.
More security issues may be discovered in the future
once the system design and operation are examined in
greater detail. We now explain the identified issues.
A. Detector control attack
Two types of detectors are used in the present implemen-
tation: ID Quantique (IDQ) ID210 gated APD and Scon-
tel TCORPS-CCR-001 superconducting nanowire single-
photon detector (SNSPD). Among them, Scontel SNSPD
is at least partially controllable by bright light [54–56].
Whether the same was true for ID210, required exper-
imental testing. From our previous measurements on
ID Quantique Clavis2 QKD system, we know that it is
possible to blind its detectors by sending a continuous-
wave (c.w.) light of power Pblind = 0.3 mW [10]. Then
by choosing a trigger pulse power Ptr greater than the
threshold power Pth = 0.15 mW, it is possible to force a
6TABLE III. Summary of potential security issues in ITMO’s subcarrier wave QKD system. Cinit, hardness of
initial (analysed) implementation against this security issue; Ccurr, hardness of the current (patched) implementation against
this security issue. Ccurr reflects the current knowledge about the security issue, and may change in the future (see Sec. III).
Q, system implementation layers involved (see Sec. II).
Potential
security issue
Cinit Q
Target
component
Brief
description
Needed
lab
testing?
Initial
risk
evaluation
Ccurr Current status
Detector
control attack
CX Q1–
5,7
SPDs See Ref. 51. Yes High C2 Loophole has been experimentally
confirmed and the suggested
countermeasures [30] have been
implemented in the current version.
Laser damage CX Q1,3 Alice’s &
Bob’s
optics
See Ref. 9. Yes High C2 Loophole has been experimentally
confirmed in Alice and the suggested
countermeasures [31] have been
implemented in the current version.
Trojan horse C2,
C0
Q1 Alice’s &
Bob’s
optics
See Ref. 21. Yes Low
(Alice),
High
(Bob)
C2,
C2
Manufacturer has developed
countermeasures (patent pending) to
be implemented in the next system
modification and then analysed
again by the testing team.
Lack of
general
security proof
C0 Q1,5 QKD
protocol
Attacks more
general than
collective
beam-splitting
should be
considered in the
security proofs.
No High C3 Was a known issue. Has been
covered by the manufacturer after
receiving the report, see Ref. 29. The
two groups continue to jointly verify
the security proof.
Time-shift
attack
CX Q1–
3,5
PMs See Sec. V F. Yes Medium CX Lower priority issue that is a subject
for future work.
Privacy
amplification
C0 Q5 Post-
processing
See Sec. V G. No High C3 Was a known issue. Has been
covered by the manufacturer after
receiving the report, see Ref. 29.
Finite key size
effects
C0 Q5 QKD
protocol
See Ref. 52. No Low C3 Was a known issue. Has been
covered by the manufacturer after
receiving the report, see Ref. 29.
Non-quantum
RNG
C0 Q5 RNG See Sec. V I. No Low C3 Was a known issue. The
manufacturer has put effort into
quantum RNG research [53] and has
selected a physical RNG for the
commercial version of the system.
Intersymbol
interference
CX Q1–3 PM’s
drivers
See Sec. V J. Yes Low CX Lower priority issue that is a subject
for future work.
click when Bob-Eve phases match. If we assume ID210
behaves similarly to the detectors in Clavis2 system, then
Eve could send c.w. power PB to blind the present detec-
tor and perform the faked-state attack outlined in Ref. 3.
However, sending a trigger power Ptr at the subcarrier
frequency will not work as the photons will be shifted
to another frequency due to Bob’s modulation. Instead,
Eve needs to inject extra photons in the reference signal
frequency so that they are shifted to the subcarrier after
the modulation and trigger a click in the blinded detector.
Due to the small m in the present system, the reference
power required by Eve is Pref ≈ Ptr/m. For example,
for m = 0.05, a 1 ns trigger pulse at the subcarriers
with peak power Ptr > 0.15 mW [10] just before the
detectors would require a 1 ns wide reference pulse with
peak power of Pref > 3 mW at Bob’s input. This is
an easily generated and transmitted optical power. The
strategy of the faked-state attack is as follows.
Let’s assume first that there is no reference monitor-
ing implemented in the system. Let’s assume Alice en-
codes phase ϕA. We further assume that Eve – sitting
outside Alice’s module – measures the signal (using sim-
ilar measurement setup as Bob) by randomly applying
ϕE ∈ {0, pi/2, pi, 3pi/2}. Another part of her –sitting near
Bob – sends bright c.w. light of power Pblind to blind
Bob’s side-band detector. When ϕE = ϕA, she gets
7a detection. In this case, she recreates the reference-
subcarrier pulse pairs scaling their powers up to make
Pref = 3 mW. When Bob also measures in the same
basis as Alice-Eve and ϕE = ϕB (ϕE = ϕB ± pi), this
results in constructive (destructive) interference and will
(will not) trigger a click in the blinded sideband detec-
tor. If Bob and Eve select different bases, Bob should
not register any detection. For the slots when Eve gets
no detection due to ϕE 6= ϕA or low detection efficiency,
she simply does nothing owing to the absence of reference
pulse monitoring and these events will appear as loss to
Bob.
In order to successfully perform this attack in prac-
tice, the blinded detector should be characterized to know
Pnever and Palways, which are the thresholds of the trigger
pulse power making the detector never click and always
click. The trigger pulse power Ptr in the successful attack
needs to satisfy the conditions
Ptr ≥ Palways,
1
2
Ptr ≤ Pnever.
(1)
However, if reference monitoring is implemented, both
the reference and sideband monitoring detectors would
be blinded and Eve will need to modify her strategy.
When she has a conclusive outcome, she proceeds as be-
fore. However, when her measurement outcome is incon-
clusive, i.e., ϕE 6= ϕA, Eve needs to tailor the power of
the reference signal in such a way that it is enough to
force a click on the blinded reference detector but not on
the subcarrier detector.
Note that, sometimes Eve gets a detection when mea-
suring in the opposite basis as that of Alice and has no
way to know if her measurement result coincides with
Alice’s bit. However, these states are either not detected
at Bob due to Eve-Bob bases mismatch or detected and
then discarded during sifting due to Alice-Bob bases mis-
match.
B. Laser damage
Whether the current system is vulnerable to laser dam-
age attack (LDA) [9, 57], can be ascertained only after
experimental testing. Since one of attenuating compo-
nents, a variable optical attenuator (VOA; FOD 5418) in
Alice is the closest to the channel (see Fig. 2), it will be
the first target for Eve’s LDA. Eve can send high power
laser to damage the optical attenuator to reduce its at-
tenuation. If successful, lights coming out of Alice will
have higher mean photon numbers than permitted by the
security proofs, thus compromising the security.
It will also be interesting to experimentally check the
effect of laser damage on the optical PMs to see whether
LDA can affect m. If it can, then further studies need to
be conducted to check whether it leads to a denial of ser-
vice or a security compromise. Finally, if LDA can reduce
the insertion loss for either the phase modulator (PM),
Laser PSM1 VOA

FOA LPOI
to quantum
channel
Polarization-maintaining fiber
Single-mode fiber
FC/APC
bulkhead connector
φA
FIG. 2. Alice’s optical scheme in detail. Component pigtails
are connected using angled ferrule connectors (FC/APC).
OI, optical isolator; FOA, fixed optical attenuator (plug-in
style); LP, linear polarizer; VOA, variable optical attenuator.
linear polarizer (LP), fixed optical attenuator (FOA) in
Alice or the polarization beamsplitter (PBS), PM in Bob,
it may facilitate other attacks, e.g., Trojan-horse attack.
Hence, these components must be characterized meticu-
lously against LDA.
C. Trojan-horse attack
In SCW QKD protocol, after sifting, Alice and Bob keep
only the outcomes for which they both used the same
phase, i.e., ϕA = ϕB . Thus if Eve can extract informa-
tion on either ϕA or ϕB by performing a Trojan-horse
attack (THA) [22, 23, 58], the security will be com-
promised. With current technology, Eve needs a mean
photon number µB→E ∼ 4 to perform homodyne detec-
tion [58]. Our security evaluation of the system against
THA is detailed below.
1. Alice
In the present scheme (Fig. 2), possible sources
of reflection are the linear polarizer (LP; Thorlabs
ILP1550PM-APC), fixed optical attenuator (FOA; Fib-
ertool FC-FC 15 dB), optical isolator (OI; AC Photonics
PMIU15P22B11) and all the standard optical connectors
placed after the phase modulator (PSM1) (i.e., at its side
facing away from the quantum channel). We identify
that one of the strongest sources of reflection is the LP
with 45 dB return loss. Assuming the VOA is set to
70 dB (which is a typical attenuation value required by
the SCW QKD protocol), and insertion loss of each con-
nector is 0.3 dB, the total round-trip attenuation experi-
enced by a Trojan photon is about 186.8 dB. This means,
in order to get one photon out, an eavesdropper needs to
send 4.79×1018 photons per pulse into the system, which
– considering a phase change frequency of f = 100 MHz –
corresponds to injecting a power of 61.4 MW at 1550 nm.
This is way above the tolerable limit of standard fibers,
which suggests the risk of Trojan-horse attack on Alice
side is relatively low. It is also important to check the
reflection from the OI, which requires experimental test-
ing. Finally, this analysis should be repeated for lower
attenuation settings of the VOA and the risk should be
evaluated accordingly. Note that, wavelength can also
be an attack variable [11] and it is important to mea-
8sure experimentally the actual value of reflected power
from LP, FOA, OI and the connectors for a large range
of wavelengths that Eve could in practice use.
2. Bob
The risk of THA on Bob seems to be comparatively
higher than that at Alice since there is no attenuator or
isolator in Bob’s module (Fig. 3). The return loss (RL) of
the polarization beam combiner (PBC) just after PSM2
is 50 dB while the insertion loss of the polarization beam
splitter (PBS), PSM2, and each of the three connectors
is 0.48, 1.7, and 0.3 dB. In order to get µB→E photons
out of Bob, Eve needs to inject a power of
PE→B = µB→E
fhc
λ
10l/10, (2)
where h is the Planck constant, c is the speed of light,
λ is the attack wavelength, and l is the total loss in dB
experienced by the Trojan photons. Assuming the point
of reflection is the PBC just after the phase modulator,
and Eve uses λ = 1550 nm as her attack wavelength,
the total loss experienced by a Trojan photon will be
l = 56.2 dB. This means that in order to get a single
photon out, Eve needs to inject a power of only PE→B =
5.35 µW, which is quite feasible.
Note that ID210 runs in gated mode with afterpuls-
ing. So, Eve can send the Trojan photons just after the
gate but still inside the phase modulation window. How-
ever, this may cause a high level of afterpulsing in Bob’s
single-photon detectors [58]. Scontel TCORPS-CCR-001
has no afterpulsing but it runs in continuous mode thus
making it difficult for Eve to send Trojan photons. Eve
can resort to a longer wavelength (such as 1924 nm) to
reduce both the afterpulsing side-effect [11] and also the
probability of the Trojan photons to be detected. As a
result, wavelength filters are also necessary in Bob. Nev-
ertheless, afterpulsing characterization of detectors along
with characterization of the wavelength filter at longer
wavelengths are necessary in order to prevent THA.
To summarise, the secure key rate in the presence of
THA – under reasonable assumptions – was calculated
for both single-photon and decoy state Bennett-Brassard
1984 (BB84) protocol in Ref. 21. These results were
based on Alice’s ability to upper bound the outgoing
mean photon number µout. Similar analyses should be
performed under assumptions appropriate for the present
scheme to upper bound µout. This should be a future
study.
D. Need for carrier monitoring
In a photon number splitting (PNS) attack [34, 59] or
unambiguous state discrimination (USD) attack [6, 60],
Eve needs to suppress some pulses. But, in the SCW
QKD system, if Eve suppresses the subcarrier pulses, and
PSM2
φB
from quantum
channel
PBS
PBC
SPD
FBG
C
φB
FIG. 3. Bob’s optical scheme in detail. Bob’s phase shift mod-
ulator PSM2 is polarization-insensitive and is implemented as
two identical modulators acting on orthogonal components of
input polarization. PBS, fiber-optic polarization beam split-
ter; PBC, fiber-optic polarization beam combiner; C, circula-
tor; FBG, fiber Bragg grating.
passes only the carrier pulses, this will cause extra errors
in Bob. This necessitates the suppression of both the
subcarrier and reference pulses so that they appear to
Bob as lost signals. To prevent this, Bob must moni-
tor the arrival of reference pulses. However, based on
our discussions with ITMO’s engineers, we learned that
the monitoring of the reference signal might not be im-
plemented partly due to implementation complexity and
partly because they do not deem it necessary for security,
because Ref. 50 shows that the system is secure against
a collective beam splitting attack over a large distance.
Here, we emphasize that even though the system is secure
against the collective beam splitting attack from Ref. 50,
more general attacks might be possible to compromise
the security. The attack is as follows:
• Eve intercepts Alice’s signals just outside Alice’s
module and splits a tiny fraction x of it.
• Eve performs a quantum non-demolition (QND)
measurement on the split signal [60].
• If no photons are found, she splits another fraction
x. She does this until her induced loss equals the
line loss.
• When photons are found she keeps them in her
quantum memory and sends the rest of the signals
to Bob via a lossless channel. The state of each
photon in her possession is
|ψ〉e = (a† +meiϕAb†) |0〉A |0〉B , (3)
where a† and b† are the creation operators on the
carrier and subcarrier modes respectively, m is the
modulation index and ϕA is Alice’s phase encoding.
• For different values of ϕA ∈ {0, pi/2, pi, 3pi/2}, Eve’s
states are not orthogonal. To make them orthog-
onal to each other, Eve needs to apply a filtering
operation
Asuccess = m |0〉B 〈0|B + |1〉B 〈1|B ,
Afail = I −Asuccess. (4)
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|ψ′〉e = (a† + eiϕAb†) |0〉A |0〉B (5)
with a success probability
Psuccess =
2m2
1 +m2
. (6)
• When the bases are revealed during sifting, Eve
simply measures |ψ′〉e in the correct basis to extract
ϕA.
This attack is more general than the collective beam
splitting attack from Ref. 50. This is because, in Ref. 50,
for a line loss η Eve uses a (1 − η) : η beam splitter
and the attack only succeeds when both Eve and Bob
receive a photon. This becomes less likely as the line
loss increases. However, in the present case Eve is not
restricted to split in the (1− η) : η ratio for the line loss
η, which gives her more power. Thus, the security proof
should be updated to include the more (and ideally the
most) general attacks than the collective beam splitting
attacks.
E. Manipulation of reference pulse
Here we assume that the reference pulse monitoring is im-
plemented in the system and analyse the consequences. If
care is not taken during the implementation, there might
still be ways for Eve to perform the USD attack as ex-
plained next.
First, Eve intercepts Alice’s signal just outside Alice’s
lab and performs a USD measurement [61]. For any con-
clusive measurement, she prepares the same state with a
higher mean photon number and sends it to Bob via a
lossless channel, in order to maximize his detection prob-
ability. For any inconclusive measurement, she still needs
to send the reference signal to Bob and wants it to be de-
tected. However, sending only the reference signal while
suppressing the sidebands does not work (see Sec. V D).
Instead, Eve wishes the subcarrier signal detection prob-
ability to be as low as possible while still keeping the
reference signal detection probability as high as possible.
The number of photons in the subcarrier and reference
signal – after Bob’s modulation – is given in Ref. 50 as
nsbph = αµ0η(L)ηB
[
1− |ds00(β′)|2
]
,
nrefph = αµ0η(L)ηB |ds00(β′)|2.
(7)
Here, µ0 is the mean photon number of the reference
pulse, η(L) is channel transmission, ηB is transmission
in Bob module, and α is additional loss induced by Eve.
|ds00(β′)| is the Wigner d−function that decides the num-
ber of photons to be shifted from reference to side-bands
based on its argument β′, which itself is a function of the
modulation index and the phase difference between Alice
and Bob.
We assume that avalanche photo diodes (APDs) are
used for the detection of both the reference and sub-
carrier signals. Then the detection probability in mode
i ∈ {ref, sb} is P idet = 1 − e−n
i
ph (for simplicity, we con-
sider unity detection efficiency). For normal operation,
nsbph  nrefph, which leads to P sbdet  P refdet. Depending on
the chosen value of m and µ0, P
sb
det can be significantly
more sensitive to α compared to P refdet. In that case, in-
creasing α would reduce P sbdet much faster than P
ref
det. As
a result, it might be possible for Eve to reduce subcar-
rier signal detection rate without affecting the reference
detection rate considerably. The small reduction in P refdet
can be compensated by adjusting the power of the pulses
sent during the conclusive measurement cases. The only
limitation on α is that P refdet should not be lowered signifi-
cantly for Alice and Bob to notice. A countermeasure to
this attack can be to monitor the reference and subcar-
rier detection rates. However, a further study is required
to find the optimal strategy to monitor the reference and
subcarriers and also designing the monitoring detector,
determining µ0, monitoring threshold, and m.
F. Time-shift attack
We suspect that it might be possible for Eve to control
the time delay of the reference and side-band signals rel-
ative to the synchronization pulse to shift their arrival
times into a specific moment inside or outside the phase
modulation window. This might make the system vulner-
able against time-shift attacks (TSA) [62]. A time-shift
attack can be performed on the SCW QKD system as fol-
lows. For ease of understanding, let us first assume that
there is a time gap between successive phase modulation
windows, and outside the modulation windows the phase
is 0. We assume a faked-state attack in which Eve stays
outside of Alice’s module and performs USD of Alice’s
states. Whenever she obtains a conclusive outcome, she
sends the same state ϕE to Bob in the correct time win-
dow (i.e., she does not alter the arrival time). When Bob
measures in the same basis, and ϕE = ϕB (ϕE 6= ϕB),
he gets a click (no click). However, when Eve obtains an
inconclusive outcome, she generates a ϕE = pi state and
sends it outside the phase modulation window. Since
outside the modulation window the phase applied is 0,
this ensures no detection by Bob’s detector.
In our discussion with the developers, we learned that
in the current SCW QKD implementation, there is no
gap between successive phase modulation windows. How-
ever, at the transition region from one window to the
next, there is a fast fluctuation. Thus, it will be interest-
ing to know what effective phase shift is experienced by
a pulse if it is sent at the time interval corresponding to
the fluctuations. For example, if the effective phase shift
is ϕ0, then it might still be possible for Eve to remain
inconspicuous during the inconclusive measurement slots
by sending a state ϕE = pi+ϕ0. However, the feasibility
of this attack can only be ascertained by experimental
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testing. For that, one needs to characterize Bob’s phase
modulation windows – including the transition regions –
in the time domain for all phase values. Click processing
by Bob will also need to be checked for detection times
in the transition regions.
G. Privacy amplification method
In the composability framework of QKD [63], to achieve
-security, it is required that Alice and Bob estimate the
upper bound of Eve’s information on their key up to the
end of error correction step, and apply a proper universal-
2 hash function. This is done to generate a shorter secret
key such that the probability that the key is not perfect
and the protocol did not abort is bounded by . How-
ever, the present system does privacy amplification by
first calculating secret key size and then randomly dis-
carding bits in the error-corrected key to match that cal-
culated secret key size. The disadvantage of this random
key removal procedure compared to hashing is that Eve
can listen to the classical communication between Alice
and Bob and follow the exact procedure to discard bits
from her own set. At the end, -security cannot be guar-
anteed. To make the secret key -secure according to the
composability framework, the proper implementation of
privacy amplification using the hash function is advised.
H. Finite-key-size analysis
In the present system, the size of the raw key is limited
by the size of Alice’s memory (1 Mbit). According to the
developers, this leads to a sifted key size of ≈ 20 kbit for
a distance of 12 km. For a larger distance of 200 km,
the size becomes as low as ≈ 10 kbit [42]. 10% of this
sifted key is used for parameter estimation. This small
sample size has a high probability to lead to discrepancies
between the estimated and actual parameter values due
to finite-size-effects [64]. Since the present security proof
used by the developers does not consider the finite-key-
size effects, the system might be vulnerable to them.
Based on our previous analysis on a different sys-
tem [65], we know that the finite-size effects become sig-
nificant when the sifted key size is lower than 200 kbit. At
that size of the sifted key, the system – without finite-size-
analysis – generated a larger secret key than the upper-
bound set by the finite-key-size analysis. Thus, security
of the generated key was not guaranteed. Since the sifted-
key size of 20 kbit in the present system is much lower
than 200 kbit, we strongly suspect that finite-size effects
are significant. Thus, we advise to develop a thorough
finite-key analysis. To do this, any deviation of param-
eters due to finite-size-effect needs to be analysed. An
example of this effect is the collision probability, i.e., the
probability of a hash function mapping two different in-
put keys to the same output key. Other examples could
be found in Refs. 52, 63, 66–68.
I. Non-quantum random number generator
In the present system, three types of random number
generators (RNGs) are used. One is a pseudorandom
number generation software drand48 r from Linux oper-
ating system. The second is a commercial product man-
ufactured by the developers of this QKD system. The
third one is the internal RNG of Altera Cyclone IV field-
programmable gate array (FPGA) chip. Using a pseudo-
random generator (or randomness expansion) does not
satisfy the randomness assumption of security proof. For
the other two generators, care should be taken to ver-
ify the quantum origin of the random numbers and the
quality of implementation.
J. Intersymbol interference
Owing to the limited bandwidth of the driving electron-
ics, high speed systems might exhibit intensity correla-
tion among the neighboring pulses – an effect known as
the intersymbol interference or the pattern effect [69, 70].
The electronic signal applied to the modulator might be
dependent on the preceding pulse, which violates the as-
sumption of security proof. This may lead to vulnerabil-
ity. Testing should be done in order to assess the risk of
the intersymbol interference in the present system.
VI. POSSIBLE COUNTERMEASURES AND
FOLLOW-UP
After the analysis reported in Sec. V, we have performed
laboratory testing of the two potential hardware vulner-
abilities with the highest rated risk (see Table III). For
both of these, the testing has confirmed the vulnerabil-
ity’s presence.
For the detector control attack (Sec. V A), we have
tested both detector units and found that ID210 is fully
controllable by bright light [30], while Scontel SNSPD
with a built-in electronic countermeasure (recently devel-
oped by Scontel) is partially controllable and the coun-
termeasure in it needs to be improved [56]. In particular,
the optical power required to control ID210 can easily be
generated and transmitted through Bob’s optical scheme
[30], confirming our original risk assessment. Technical
countermeasures against this attack are currently under
consideration. We remark that this vulnerability remains
unsolved in most existing QKD systems [71].
For the laser damage attack (Sec. V B), we have per-
formed laboratory testing of the VOA unit (FOD 5418)
and found it to be severely vulnerable to the LDA [31].
A brief application of ∼ 2.8 W c.w. laser power damages
a metal film layer inside this component and reliably re-
duces its attenuation by ∼ 10 dB, which renders the key
insecure. A countermeasure currently under considera-
tion is to insert another component between the line and
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the VOA, in order to prevent the latter from being ex-
posed to high power. Candidates for this other compo-
nent are being tested [72].
The manufacturer has designed countermeasures for
the above attacks on the hardware and implemented
them in the current version of the SCW QKD system.
They will be tested experimentally as a part of future
work.
Protocol-related issues have been addressed as follows.
A proof of security for a general attack, the lack of which
has been highlighted in Sec. V D, has been developed
[29]. It is summarised in Sec. VI A below. The issues
related to both the USD attack (Sec. V E) and refer-
ence pulse (Sec. V D) have been closed by an analysis of
advanced USD attack and appropriate countermeasures
[73, 74]. We recap these results in Sec. VI B below. Fi-
nally a correct privacy amplification method (Sec. V G)
and finite-key analysis (Sec. V H) have been included in
Ref. 29. The finite-key analysis is recapped in Sec. VI C
below. Since these issues appear to have been addressed
by this recently published theoretical work, we have up-
dated their current hardness level in Table III to C3.
Several other issues from Table III have also been anal-
ysed and patched by the manufacturer. Overall, our joint
work has allowed ITMO University and Quantum Com-
munications Ltd. to quickly patch most of the loopholes
by introducing countermeasures. The implementation
hardness levels have been raised from Cinit of CX and
C0 at the time of the initial report to the current state
Ccurr of mostly C2 or even C3. Countermeasures marked
C2 may eventually become C3, after additional experi-
mental testing and improvement. The two groups also
continue to jointly verify the protocol security proof.
A. Asymptotic security
We assume here, that the family of protocols consid-
ering in this paper belongs to the class of one-way QKD
protocols with independent and identically-distributed
(i.i.d.) information carriers and direct reconciliation. It
is commonly accepted that secure key generation rate K
for the protocols of this class in the presence of collective
attacks in asymptotic regime is lower bounded according
to [75, 76] by the Devetak-Winter bound [77]
K = νSPB
[
1− leakEC(Q)−max
E
χ(A : E)
]
, (8)
where νS is the repetition rate; PB is the probability
of successful decoding and accepting a bit in a single
transmission window; Q is the quantum bit error rate
(QBER), the probability that a bit accepted by Bob is
erroneous; codeEC(Q) is the amount of information re-
vealed by Alice through the public channel for the sake
of error correction, which depends on QBER and is lim-
ited by the Shannon bound: codeEC(Q) ≥ h(Q) where
h(Q) = −Q log2Q−(1−Q) log2(1−Q) is the binary Shan-
non entropy. Quantity χ(A : E) in Eq. (8)) is the Holevo
capacity, giving an upper bound for amount of informa-
tion accessible to eavesdropper Eve in a given collective
attack (quantum channel). It is well-known that coher-
ent attacks in i.i.d. case can be bounded with collective
attacks. So one usually considers coherent attacks as gen-
eral collective attacks [78] in terms of arbitrary unitary
operations on purified states in enlarged Hilbert space
(described in terms of isometry) provided by Eve.
In Reference 29, the result of arbitrary isometry is con-
sidered in order to estimate Holevo capacity in comple-
mentary channel. Eve performs unitary operation (de-
scribed by isometry) between states in the channel and
Eve’s ancillas to make them (in general case) entangled
in some way [79]. It has been shown that Holevo capac-
ity of complementary channel is maximized when states
become untangled (but interacted). Further considering
the property of isometry, i.e., preserving the overlap be-
tween the states, it has been shown that highest mutual
information between Alice and Eve is bounded by the
Holevo bound. This statement eliminates the necessity
to consider particular kinds of isometries.
In case of subcarrier wave quantum key distribution
Holevo bound can be found considering reduced uncon-
ditioned channel density operator, i.e., considering only
two states since Eve can wait to measure her states after
reconciliation. Therefore the obtained Holevo bound us-
ing binary Shannon entropy function h(x) = −x log2 x−
(1− x) log2(1− x) of the unconditioned channel density
operator eigenvalues is as follows:
χ(ρ) = h
(
1
2
(1− exp [−µ0 (1− dS00(2β))]) , (9)
where µ0 is the amplitude of the coherent state on the
of carrier wave determined by the average number of
photons in a transmission window provided with coher-
ent monochromatic light beam with optical frequency ω,
dS00(β) is the Wigner d-function from the quantum the-
ory of angular momentum [80], and β is determined by
the modulation index m [50].
B. Advanced unambiguous-state-discrimination
attack
The collective attack that considers a mutual information
between Alice and Eve might not be the most general
attack. There might be attacks that decrease conditional
mutual information I(A;B|E) to zero. An example of
such attack has been introduced in Ref. 74 where Eve
performs an errorless USD measurement [81, 82] then
blocks inconclusive results and alters (amplifies and adds
errors) the distinguished states. The latter is necessary to
maintain both detection and error rates. In Reference 74
the condition of revealing Eve’s actions [83] is generalised
as
Pdet > PUSD, (10)
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where Pdet is an expected detection probability and PUSD
is the probability of unambiguous state discrimination.
Obviously there are two main strategies to increase the
performance of the system. The first is to increase Pdet
and the second is to decrease PUSD. We refer to Refs. 73
and 74 for a further discussion of proposed approaches
against the USD attack.
C. Finite-key security
Since the resources such as time and memory are fi-
nite, it is not sufficient to consider asymptotic secu-
rity. Therefore, in Ref. 29 a finite-key analysis has
been performed. To estimate appropriate bound on se-
cure key rate we consider the notation of Renyi en-
tropies Hα(X) =
1
1−α log (
∑n
i=1 p
α
i ), because they de-
scribe the worst case and not the average one. In the
paper we consider that α→∞ since we use min-entropy
H∞(X) = Hmin = − log maxi pi. Thereby a quantum
asymptotic equipartition property (QAEP) [84] is con-
sidered in order to bound ε-smooth min-entropy by von
Neumann entropy. It means that for a large number of
rounds, the operationally relevant total uncertainty can
be well approximated by the sum over all i.i.d. rounds.
In SCW QKD, conditional von Neumann entropy, or
more precisely an entropy of Alice’s bit conditioned on
Eve’s side-information in a single round, is bound as
H(A|E) ≥ 1− χ(ρ).
To provide the key extraction one should carry out the
following steps.
(i) Parameter estimation. One should estimate the
error rate (Bob publicly sends a random subset of k bits
to Alice, and she estimates the QBERQest in that subset)
and detection rate at Bob’s side.
(ii) Error correction. At this step both legitimate
parties should check and correct the errors in their bit
strings. It can be done using any error correction code.
(iii) Privacy amplification. In Reference 29, the pri-
vacy amplification has been studied using the bound from
Ref. 85, which tells us that the trace distance d between
the protocol’s output and an ideal output (where the key
is uniform and independent from Eve, even after Eve
knows the matrix used for the hashing) is bound above
by
d =
1
2
‖ρKFE − ωK ⊗ σFE‖1
≤ εs + 1
2
√
2l−H
εs
min(A
′|E)
≤ εs + 1
2
√
2−lossPA
≤ εs + εPA = εsec,
(11)
where in the last step the quantity εsec is introduced as
an upper bound on d.
Reference 29 gives the final result that the protocol is
εcorr-correct with εcorr = εEC and εsec-secure with εsec =
εs + εPA, hence εQKD-secure-and-correct, with εQKD =
εEC + εs + εPA providing secure bit string with length
l = n(1− χ(ρ))− 4√n log
(
2 +
√
2
)√
log
(
2
ε2S
)
−
−k − codeEC(Q)− log 1
εEC
− log 1
εPA
+ 2.
(12)
VII. CONCLUSION
The lack of security certification for quantum cryptogra-
phy is ironic, since security is the main concern behind
the shift from classical to quantum cryptography. In this
work we have presented a methodology for security evalu-
ation of a complete quantum communication system. To
do so, we have subdivided the complete system imple-
mentation into seven layers based on a hierarchical order
of information flow and categorised the implementation
imperfections based on the hardness of the realised so-
lution and practical risk. Using these classifications, we
have evaluated the security of the SCW QKD system
from ITMO University and Quantum Communications
Ltd. We have found a number of potential security is-
sues that need careful investigation by the manufacturer.
Experimental tests, countermeasure and theory develop-
ment have followed. As the result, most of the issues
have been addressed, increasing the hardness rating of
this implementation. We would like to add that a sim-
ilar process is also going on with two other systems (by
ID Quantique and QuantumCTek) that we earlier anal-
ysed.
One important but sometimes overlooked aspect
should be emphasised. When someone is in the process of
designing a system, his mindset tends to become biased,
and he may not be able to think from a different point of
view and see security problems with his own design. This
is the very reason the task of security certification should
be done in collaboration with third-party experts whose
main goal is to find problems. This helps a responsible
QKD manufacturer to quickly assess and resolve the secu-
rity issues, as has clearly happened in the case of ITMO.
Furthermore, the third-party analysis should ideally be-
gin during initial design considerations, rather than after
the commercial implementation has been completed (as
has been the case here).
We hope our security evaluation approach will pave
the way towards development of a security certification
methodology for existing and future quantum communi-
cation systems.
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